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What follows is an exploration of the relation between Plotinus’ thought and the
work of Bruce Nauman, one of the most prolific and controversial artists of our
times. My primary aim is to examine the way in which Nauman and Plotinus engage
in a similar problematic concerning the relation between art and self, between the
project of being a self and the project of being an artist. Both Plotinus’ and Nauman’s
works are informed by a concentrated interest in the relationship between selfhood
and art. A distinctive mark of Plotinus’ philosophy is a pioneering account of soul and
selfhood developed in tandem with a carefully constructed defence of creativity and
art. Nauman’s work is particularly pertinent because the issue of the self is a constant
thematic pre- occupation explored, in ways informed by Nauman’s highly self-reflec-
tive attitude towards (his) art, in a variety of media and their combinations, from
short films and video art, to photographs, performance pieces, installations, or
sculptures.
There have been various attempts to bring Plotinian philosophy into contact with
contemporary aesthetics and art, although very rarely, if at all, with video art and
film.1 Regardless of their particular aims, these attempts raise the issue of the rele-
vance of Plotinus’ thought for understanding the changes in the practice and theory of
art triggered by the various artistic movements of the late DHth and early BCth centu-
ry.2 This relevance is thus assessed by the extent to which the deployment of Plotinian
thought can enrich our understanding of contemporary art. Hence the movement of
understanding in this kind of approach is invariably one-way: from Plotinus to con-
temporary art. In this chapter I will juxtapose Plotinus and Nauman in an attempt to
enrich our understanding of both figures. This attempt does not consist in an histori-
cal enquiry: there is no evidence that Nauman has read Plotinus, and there are no di-
rect historical links connecting them. Rather, I argue, that if, in some properly quali-
fied sense, both Plotinus and Nauman engage with the same problematic, namely the
question of selfhood, then the similarities and differences between their respective en-
gagements with it are not just illuminating of Nauman’s creative output, but they can
also shed some light on Plotinus’ thought.
The first section presents a synoptic overview of Plotinus’ conception of art and
Nauman’s artistic project, thus setting the stage for the encounter between a philoso-
pher and an artist. The second section outlines the problematic of human selfhood and
its connection with art both in Plotinus and Nauman. With this necessary context in
place, the third section proceeds to the discussion of Nauman’s engagement with the
issue of the self, with constant reference to relevant Plotinian themes, through an
examination of three particularly per- tinent and interconnected works, delivered in
different media. At its core lies the interpretation of Live-Taped Video Corridor
(DHFC), an installation that relies heavily on video art, informed and further enriched
D. One such rare occasion linking Plotinus to film is Botz-Bornstein (BCCZ).
B. For example, Alexandrakis BCCB, focuses on the relevance of Plotinus’ notion of beauty in a con-
temporary context; Beierwaltes BCCB, offers a broader overview of selected relevant themes.
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by the discussion of From Hand to Mouth (DH]F) and Lighted Performance Box
(DH]H).
D Philosophy and Art
Plotinus’ reflections on art are embedded within a broader philosophical discourse
on beauty, which in turn has a systematic function in the context of Plotinus’ meta-
physics, epistemology, and psychology. Prima facie, this is hardly a promising start-
ing point for establishing the relevance of a Plotinian framework with regard to con-
temporary art, since its philosophical presuppositions are quite foreign to the
metaphysical principles of Neoplatonism. Plotinus adopts a broader notion of beauty
than the modern one, which, after Kant, restricts beauty to sensibility; and he treats
art as belonging to the order of nature, in contrast to the contemporary understanding
of art that, after Hegel, places it firmly within history (Hegel DHF_: B, H‒DD). However,
the very fact that Plotinus elaborates his conception of art on the basis of systematic
philosophical considerations, without actually taking into account the specific charac-
teristics of works of art or artistic practices historically available to him, strengthens
surprisingly the prospect of establishing the relevance that his reflections on art may
have for us today.
Consider in this light Plotinus’ well-known defence of art against its nameless “de-
spisers,” a passage that encapsulates the essence of his understanding of art:
But if anyone despises the arts because they produce their works by
imitating nature, we must tell him, first, that natural things are imita-
tions too. Then he must know that the arts do not simply imitate what
they see, but they run back up to the forming principles from which
nature derives; (…) For Pheidias too did not make his Zeus from any
model perceived by the senses, but understood what Zeus would look
like if he wanted to make himself visible. (Enn. v 8, 1, 32-41)3
e. Plotinus’ text is that of Henry and Schwyzer DH]Z‒EB, and translations follow, with frequent revi-
sions, Armstrong DH]]‒EE.
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In this passage, it is relatively easy to disregard the art-historical implications of the
reference to Pheidias’ statue of Zeus. Plotinus (who most probably had not actually
seen the statue) merely uses it as an example of a work of art widely considered to be
successful, without drawing any normative conclusions regarding the acceptable
form, content, or medium of works of art.4 It is rather more difficult to disregard Plot-
inus’ metaphysical assumption, i.e., the Platonic claim that sensible nature in general
should be conceived as an image that imitates a beautiful intelligible world, and its
immediate implication with regard to art that the norm of the successful work of art is
the sensible presentation of this beauty, already visible in natural objects.
However, this passage already suggests two important points for the interpretation
of this implication. First, it is not the primary function of art to present in some way
sensible objects: nothing material is, for Plotinus, beautiful in itself and thus worthy
of artistic imitation. This is because, second, Plotinian beauty is not essentially a mat-
ter of some (definite or indefinite) sensible characteristic of an object stimulating the
spectator in the appropriate (pleasurable) way,5 but rather a question of the success
with which sensible objects can be naturally or artificially motivated to exhibit intelli-
gible content. In other words, for Plotinus, art is essentially symbolic or conceptual, it
presents meanings not things. Accordingly, works of art should be considered as
“metaphors,” “translations,” “symbols” or “interpretations” of meanings in sensible
or material terms, to be judged not on the basis of any notion of verisimilitude (their
Z. For a historical examination of the issues raised by this passage, see Kuisma BCCe: Ee‒DeD, includ-
ing additional references to the relevant literature (Plotinus’ conventional use of Pheidias’ statue is
documented in DBC‒DBB).
_. Plotinus argues explicitly against an understanding of beauty in terms of sensible (formal or mate-
rial) qualities in i ], D and vi F, BB. He notes the intimate link between beauty and pleasure (e.g., in
i ], D, DE‒DH; B B‒Z; Z De‒DE), but attributes this pleasure to the affinity that the spectator’s soul
feels for the intelligible content made sensibly present through the form of the beautiful object
(see i ], e, D‒H).
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adequacy to their apparent objects within the order of sensibility), but rather in terms
of the “metaphoric” effectiveness of the link to meaning they establish.6
This conception of art can be further illuminated if we situate it within Plotinus’ un-
derstanding of human creativity in general. Plotinus clearly subordinates the practical
capacities and interests of the human subject to her theoretical ones by claiming both
that the theoretical availability of an object is a necessary condition for its successful
creation, and that the essential purpose of the creation of an object is to make it avail-
able to its creator as an object of theoretical contemplation.7 These claims, implicated
in Plotinus’ “defence” of the artist as someone who has prior theoretical access to the
intelligible item she wants to “translate” into sensible terms, clearly imply that cre-
ative activity cannot possess any value of its own, since it is not undertaken for its
own sake, but rather so that “the finished product would be an object or a form of
contemplation” (iii E, F, E‒DC). One could indeed wonder what the point of any cre-
ative activity of this kind is, since its purpose seems to be the contemplative recovery
of a theoretical object already available at the beginning of the creative process. How
can Plotinus assert at the same time that one has to know something in order to make
it and to make it in order to know it?
One way to resolve this tension at a broad metaphysical level would be to say that
Zeus wills to make himself visible, assigning thus to artists this mediating task. Dif-
ferently put, meaning, even if otherwise available through philosophical contempla-
tion in its pure intelligibility, must be “interpreted” in sensible or material configura-
tions, so that nothing remains without its proper share of meaning in the whole of
reality.8 Another way would be to account for the function of art (or other practical
]. For a more elaborate discussion of the claims made here about Plotinus’ conception of art, and his
notion of creativity, see Vassilopoulou BCDZ: ZHe‒ZHE.
F. “Some wisdom makes all the things which have come into being, whether they are products of art
or nature” (v E, _, D‒e), while “action is for the sake of contemplation and vision, so that for men
of action, too, contemplation is the goal” (iii E, ], D‒B).
E. “Creating is bringing a form into being, and this is filling all things with contemplation” (iii E, F,
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activities) with reference to agents who, although motivated by a desire to contem-
plate, cannot satisfy it directly, and thus “what they cannot get by going straight to it,
so to speak, they seek to obtain by going round about” (iii E, ], D‒Z). According to
Plotinus, what characterises these agents is a certain deficiency, an inability to satisfy
their contemplative interests internally through pure thinking. For this reason, they
have to “utter” (pro-pherein as in meta-pherein), articulate, or express through cre-
ative projects the relevant objects, “with a view to examining, trying to learn thor-
oughly” (iii E, ], BE‒BH) what in a sense they already “possess,” even if they cannot
have it directly available as “present in their soul” (iii E, ], ]). In this case, the object
is not sufficiently known at the beginning of the creative process to guide it securely;
however, it is available as an intimation strong enough to prompt and orientate a cre-
ative process aiming at its clarification.
These remarks give us a sense of Plotinus’ conception of art and enable us to ad-
dress the issue of its broad applicability to contemporary art. One way to assess it is
by comparing Plotinus’ conception with substantive conceptions of art that take into
account contemporary developments in the art world. A good example would be
Arthur Danto’s conditions for art: “first that works of art are always about something,
and hence have a content or meaning; and second that to be a work of art something
had to embody its meaning” (Danto BCCC: DeB), i.e., “to show what [it is] about”
(Danto BCCC: Dee). Or, in Nöel Carroll’s gloss, “to discover a mode of presentation
that is intended to be appropriate to its meaning” (Carroll DHHF: eE]).
Danto’s conception seems particularly suited to contemporary art since it avoids
any reference to the modern notion of the aesthetic (to the aesthetic experience of the
subject or the aesthetic properties of the object), which would appear unnecessarily
restrictive in the contemporary context. Instead, it concentrates on the minimal re-
BB‒Be); cf. iv F, De, _‒F, i ], F, eD‒ee.
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quirement that a work of art must be an appropriately motivated sign, a sign that in
some way points to its meaning through its sensible or material form.9 This brings
Danto quite close to Plotinus, whose understanding of beauty is directly connected to
the work’s power to make meaning visible rather than being limited to its aesthetic
qualities. In this light, Plotinus’ claim that Pheidias intended to create a work reveal-
ing what “Zeus would look like if he wanted to make himself visible” (v E, D, ZD) cap-
tures brilliantly Danto’s contention that the work of art must embody its meaning.
Turning now to Bruce Nauman, who first appeared in the art-scene in the DH]Cs,
one is clearly impressed by the volume and diversity of his work ranging,
from drawings done by an obviously deft and talented hand, through
freestanding objects that all but the most reactionary academic would
agree to call sculpture, to neon signs, esoteric installations, aggressive-
ly matter-of-fact videos, to what is often called Body Art, to playing
games with language, and pure “sound” pieces. (Plagens BCDZ: DZ)
This diversity of artistic practices and media, frequently combined in specific works,
the thematic and conceptual complexity of the works and the many ways in which the
relation between the artist, the work, and the audience is articulated, make it hard to
place Nauman’s creative output under an all-inclusive medium, style, or theme, even
leading to “the realization that his oeuvre is an unmappable universe” (Battle BCCH:
E_).10 In this sense, a philosophical conception of art that relies on aesthetic notions,
or a definite objective associated with the artist or the audience, or an art historical
theory constructed around individual arts or distinct media, is clearly of limited use as
a framework for understanding Nauman’s artistic practice.
H. Danto defends his essentially Hegelian conception of art in the context of contemporary art in
Danto DHHF.
DC. A recent overview of Nauman’s work is Plagens BCDZ, with further references to previous studies;
Benezra BCCBb provides a useful survey up to the mid-HCs. Nauman BCCe is a collection of texts
and interviews by Nauman himself; Morgan BCCBa is a useful collection of essays, reviews and
documents; Lewallen BCCF is a study of Nauman’s work in the DH]Cs, the period on which this
chapter focuses.
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Instead, a broadly Plotinian approach, in which the work of art is essentially an em-
bodied object of contemplation, resonates strongly with Nauman’s conceptualism ex-
pressed through “the principle that the idea must prevail over its formal realization”
(Benezra BCCBa: HB). The impression generated when surveying Nauman’s art is that
works and projects correspond to the reflective statement or investigation of theoreti-
cal problems that he approaches “systematically, even if he often pushes their inner
logic to absurdity” (van Bruggen DHEE: DC_). This aspect, which is clearly linked to
Nauman’s well-documented background interest in philosophy and especially
Wittgenstein (e.g., Nauman BCCe: DBF, DeD; Amman DHE]; Pirenne BCDe: ZE‒_Z), im-
plies that the engagement of the viewer with Nauman’s works is essentially cognitive,
i.e., attempt to come to terms with conceptual questions and puzzles.
Certainly, for both Plotinus and Nauman, this engagement is also physical and psy-
chological, as is proper to embodied individuals who engage with embodied
meanings. For Plotinus, this may be the main shortcoming of art when compared to
philosophy; and it is strongly pronounced in Nauman, whose artistic investigations
have nothing “refined” or “subtle,” as they are typically pursued through material or
sensory configurations that, even when minimalistic, tend towards the “blatant, [the]
startling, [the] confrontational” (Wallach BCCB: e]). If artistic creativity is related to a
demand for “filling all things with contemplation” (iii E, F, Be), for turning everything
into an object of thought, Nauman is thus an extreme Plotinian artist in his insistence
that even the most resistant material (the elementary, the gross, the cheap, the appar-
ently random, the sophomoric, the industrial, the boringly matter-of-fact) is not im-
mune to the infusion of meaning. In this sense, “the basic working mode” of Nauman
appears indeed as a combination of “a visceral conceptualism and a bluntly conceptu-
al sense” (Plagens BCDZ: FB) of art.
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B Making and Knowing the Self
Plotinus’ views on art and creativity pertain also to the specific theoretical problem-
atic of human selfhood which provides the focus for the present discussion. The start-
ing point of Plotinus’ account is a metaphysical conception of the soul as a separate
entity that in significant respects resembles the “deficient” creators indicated previ-
ously. Although, in general, the soul has access to the intelligible world of meaning
(i.e., it is capable of contemplating noetic objects directly), it does not contain its own
origin within itself: the soul itself is an image of a higher metaphysical principle, the
Intellect. Hence, the soul is not available to itself as a secure object of a self-constitu-
tive contemplation through which it could achieve and sustain a self-sufficient identi-
ty (see, for example, the comparison between the soul and the Intellect in iv Z, D‒Z).
In simpler terms, since the soul does not make itself directly, it cannot know itself im-
mediately and vice versa. In order to address this “deficiency,” the soul has two op-
posing yet at the same time mutually dependent resources, one theoretical and one
practical. The first is to withdraw within itself in order to recollect in contemplation
its original simple identity, to know itself without making itself. The second is to
project itself into a series of images, in order to make itself without fully knowing it-
self. The process of projection is equivalent to the constitution of the embodied
human individual, the human self: the structure of the soul taken together with the se-
ries of images it generates corresponds to the full biological and psychological reality
of the human individual (iv e, DB, D‒DB).
This projection is essentially creative: the soul creates or shapes its embodiment as
an image of itself, and thus “externalizes” or “translates” itself into a sensible, mater-
ial configuration.11 In this sense, being a self becomes a special and important case of
DD. Note that this embodiment is not merely the biological or material body of the individual; Plotinus
is not thinking in terms of a Cartesian dualism of mind and matter. Rather, the soul’s embodiment
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being engaged in a creative project, one that is similar to the project of the artist. This
similarity is underlined in a well-known passage from the treatise “On Beauty,”
where Plotinus describes the project of being a self in terms of a self-creation to be
accomplished in the way a sculptor works on a statue:
Go back into yourself and look; and if you do not yet see yourself
beautiful, then, just as someone making a statue which has to be beau-
tiful cuts away here and polishes there and makes one part smooth and
clears another till he has given his statue a beautiful face, so you too
must cut away excess and straighten the crooked and clear the dark
and make it bright, and never stop working on your statue till the di-
vine glory of virtue shines out on you, till you see self-mastery en-
throned upon its holy seat. (i 6, 9, 7-16)
This passage can be considered as metaphorical in an ordinary, rhetorical, sense, es-
tablishing an analogy between a sculptor working on a statue and an “I” working on a
self. However, the metaphor is more complex and substantial from a philosophical
point of view, relying on another set of analogies with ontological significance for
Plotinus: as the statue is a link established through a transfer (literally metaphora) be-
tween Zeus and a piece of gold and ivory, the self is a link established through a
transfer between the I or soul and its sensible embodiment.12
The constitution of the self is a process of self-creation, and thus its various ele-
ments point back to the same entity, the soul: the soul (qua creator) creates an image
of itself (hence becoming a work), so that it (qua spectator) can then contemplate it-
self in its work. This multiplicity is the direct result of the inability of the soul to oc-
cupy simultaneously the roles of the creator and the spectator: to know itself as it
makes itself and to make itself as it knows itself without any remainder, i.e., without
the need for an external work that will mediate this process. Moreover, it establishes
includes everything that pertains to the interaction of an individual with sensible reality (e.g.,
one’s sensations, memories, pleasures, concerns, practical activities, actions).
DB. These brief remarks cannot, of course, capture the full complexity of the Plotinian embodied self.
For a detailed discussion, see Remes BCCF.
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an internal distance, extension or displacement within the soul that, in its various ex-
pressions, determines essentially the structure of the self. In this sense, being a self
is, for Plotinus, a direct consequence of the inability of the soul to be fully and imme-
diately present to itself that results in its diffraction in a spatial-temporal spectrum.
Physical space is a result of the soul’s embodiment, or more appropriately for Ploti-
nus, the body’s ensoulment: “The universe extends as far as soul goes; its limit of ex-
tension is the point to which in going forth it has soul to keep it in being” (iv e, H, Z]‒
ZE). However, the diffraction of the soul results also in the distinction between the ex-
ternal and the internal, the distance between the interiority of the soul and the exteri-
ority of its sensible image or its other creative works. This is the distance, for exam-
ple, between what I mean or intend and what I say or do, between the work as
conceived and the work as executed. For Plotinus, it marks the weakening of soul’s
metaphysical identity through the generation of self-images characterized by increas-
ing alterity. Time is also a result of the soul’s embodiment “for we maintain that we
grasp time in its essential nature as around the activity of the soul and deriving form
it” (iv Z, D_, e‒_). In the life of the embodied individual, time is implicated in the dis-
tance between the creative moment of self-projection and the reflective moment of
self-recognition in the projected image, as complicated by the ever present possibility
of a recollection of soul’s original condition. In terms of Plotinus’ metaphor of the
statue, this is the distance between first working on your statue, then pause in order to
see if indeed you can recognise yourself in the result, i.e., recognize a vision of your-
self available to you only as a recollection. From the point of view of the soul as a
metaphysical entity, these conditions, to use a Kantian formulation, are merely condi-
tions of experience: the soul, being itself outside space and time, must experience its
works in space and time, side by side, or one after the other. But for the self, con-
ceived as the link between the soul and its embodied image, these are conditions of
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being: the self is itself a constantly changing multiplicity, finding at any moment it-
self side by side with itself or before and after itself.
We could then say that the project of being a self essentially amounts to managing
the tensions and risks inherent in this fragmented condition of the soul with the help
of its theoretical and practical capacities. For Plotinus, as I have already suggested,
the final imperative of this task seems to be theoretical. The primary aim, as defined
by the Delphic oracle, is to “know yourself,” since, as he puts it in a way which
would certainly have delighted Nietzsche or Freud, this is the appropriate task for
those who because of their selves’ multiplicity have the business of
counting themselves up and learning that they do not know all of the
number and kind of things they are, or do not know any of them, not
what their ruling principle is or by what they are themselves. (vi 7, 41,
22-26)
The primacy of the theoretical delimits the scope of the corresponding practical im-
perative: one has to “make” oneself only to the extent that this contributes to the
project of “knowing” oneself. However, behind this demand for self-knowledge lies a
deeper quest for soul overcoming its fragmented condition, since the distinctive mark
of contemplation is that it “unifies more, so what knows, in so far as it knows (…)
comes into unity with what is known” (iii E, ], D]‒DF). In this sense, the primacy of
the theoretical “know yourself” over the practical “make yourself” reflects both the
importance that Plotinus attaches to the more fundamental “unify yourself” as the ul-
timate aim of the project of being a self and a certain evaluation as to how one can
achieve this kind of self-identity.
Regardless of Plotinus’ specific primacy of the theoretical over the practical, it is
clear that being a self defines a project that is both philosophical and artistic. Thus, in
one sense, to successfully engage with this project entails that each one of us has to
be in turns a philosopher and an artist. In another sense, the project itself can be a
common preoccupation of philosophers and artists; it can be fruitfully explored both
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in philosophical and artistic ways. An artistic exploration of this kind is clearly evi-
denced throughout Nauman’s work. His preoccupation with the issue of the self is so
central that it leads, for example, Robert Morgan to attribute to Nauman both a “per-
sistence in exploring art as an investigation of the self” (Morgan BCCBb: D) and a re-
solve “to think about art as a phenomenon of the self” (Morgan BCCBb: DZ), capturing
thus the raison d’être of art itself, or the task of the artist, in terms of the theoretical
and practical interests that guide and sustain the project of being a self.
This constant reflection on the possibilities and limits of the artistic representation,
expression, or communication of the self may well underlie Nauman’s “eventual con-
tribution,” the transformation of “Minimalism’s iconic (platonic) form into something
more mutative and psychological” (Auping BCCZ: E). It certainly links Nauman to the
long artistic tradition of exploring this theme13 and it is expressed throughout his cre-
ative output in a variety of ways. Thematically, there are works concerned with one’s
own body or physical self, with the self considered as a social mechanism, with the
confrontation between human individuality and modern mass society, or the relation
between the private and the public. Nauman’s engagement with selfhood is expressed
through works that typically blur, or even eliminate, the traditional separation be-
tween the artist, the work, and the audience, inserting the experience of the (actual)
artist or the (actual) viewer into the very core of the work. In terms of media, even in
the short period between DH]]‒DHFC to which this discussion is limited, Nauman pur-
sues issues pertaining to selfhood through short films, videos, photographs, perfor-
mances, sculptures, and installations combining these media in different ways. In re-
spect to their theme, each of the three works to be discussed in the following section
contributes a particular angle to the problematic of selfhood; while being of different
De. “The investigation of self by someone truly interested in exploring and then restating the self in
visual terms lies fully in keeping with the traditional art values of representation and communica-
tion of self” (Goodman BCCB: BH).
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kind, in terms of media and techniques, they highlight the interconnectedness of
Nauman’s artistic output.
e Works and Words
From Hand to Mouth (DH]F) is one of Nauman’s early and best-known sculptures.
The work is a wax cast on cloth of a hand, arm, and mouth, hung on the wall at a
height that gives the impression that it belongs to a real human being, albeit invisible
as a whole. Nauman himself described that period of his work as a time when he
“was forced to examine [him]self, and what [he] was doing [in the studio]”; this self-
examination included an interest in using his own body in his work, which often
“took the form of acting out puns” (Nauman BCCe, DDE).14 Nauman’s fascination with
the possibility of a literal “realization” of linguistic metaphors or puns is evident in
From Hand to Mouth. We start from the literal meaning of the title, “with barely
enough money or food to satisfy immediate needs,” which is then captured metaphor-
ically in the expression “from hand to mouth,” which is further transferred and literal-
ly embodied in a three-dimensional material medium. This double movement, from
the linguistic to the material/visual and from the metaphorical to the literal, raises
several issues. Some take the form of allusions pertaining to language: its origin and
nature (the emergence of speech out of gesture, i.e., in a movement from hand to
mouth; the analogy between language and tools)15 or the need of a context for the ap-
preciation of meaning: a de-contextualized expression, “cut off” from the fabric of
DZ. See Wagner BCCF: __‒_] for a discussion of the significance of the period for the emergence of
Nauman’s artistic identity. Nauman discusses further his interest in puns in Nauman BCCe: D_H.
About his influences and objectives in such works, see Lewallen BCCF: ZE‒ZH; for a broader dis-
cussion of this tendency in American art, see Bowman DHE_.
D_. Leroi-Gourhan’s Le Geste et la parole, an attempt at a unified theory linking language, gesture,
technology, and art in the context of human evolution was published in France in DH]Z. According
to Storr, From Hand to Mouth “constitutes an aesthetic equation relating the work of hands to the
workings of language, the manipulation of matter to that of words” (BCCB: D_F).
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language, is presented aesthetically as a “mutilated appendage” (De Michelis BCCH:
]H).
However, the central issue thematized directly by the work is the very notion of the
work of art as an object of embodied meaning. The literalization of meaning results in
a work that seems to bypass the issue of understanding art, by trapping the spectator
in an unsatisfactory vacuous movement from one metaphor to another that misses al-
together the encounter with meaning, displaying a “linguistic primitivism in which
the gap between signifier and signified is imagined to be closed” (Miller DHH_: DBF).
In one sense, by looking at From Hand to Mouth “what you see is what you get”
(Goodman BCCB: eC): the meaning of the work is as deadly obvious as any tautology;
in another sense, “somewhere between an expression of poverty and a literal
measurement from one part of the body to another,” “meaning is suspended” (Morgan
BCCBb: _). Nauman’s strategy clearly takes “the risks inherent to all art posed as meta-
physics: trivialization and self-regard” (Goodman BCCB: eC). Danto’s reading of the
work, for example, contends that Nauman’s transformations are “pretty silly,” show-
ing “a certain blindness to meaning or a will to subvert it” (Danto BCCB: D_B). It is in-
deed the case that understanding “the image by finding the cliché that fits it” (D_B)
does not help us understand what it means to live “from hand to mouth.” In this light,
and in order to redeem Nauman’s work, we may take it as a forceful reminder that the
intuitive concreteness and density of the artwork is always a matter of a reflective and
imaginative encounter with meaning: imitation in the derogatory Platonic sense (the
mere replication of something, be it a meaning or an object, in another medium, how-
ever literally or realistically) leads to rather impoverished, lifeless, or even “macabre”
art.16
D]. Basualdo BCCH: e_ notes the work’s “greenish surface, full of detail and somewhat macabre associ-
ations”; to these we may add its status as a “relic” (Morgan BCCBb: Z) and the impression of hol-
lowness it creates.
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However, From Hand to Mouth does not simply offer the literal rendering of a ran-
domly chosen metaphorical expression. This expression significantly alludes to a cer-
tain kind of human life, while also being a representation of the human body that can
be taken, in the most straightforward manner, as an embodied metaphor for the
human self. From this point of view, what is actually present in the work points ex-
clusively to the “parts” of the self that establish the points of contact between the in-
ternal and the external, the points through which the self interacts causally with the
world and thus becomes a part of it available in empirical experience. Along these
lines, the distance between hand and mouth must be interpreted differently: if the
hand is the point in which the self is externalized, in making, doing, working, trans-
forming the material environment in active independence, then the mouth is the point
in which the self internalizes, through ingestion, all the materials necessary for its
sustenance in passive dependence on the environment. Thus, the work may be consid-
ered as a portrait of the Plotinian artist, for whom some felt lack or deficiency pro-
vides the motivation for making, and the project of being a self is exclusively focused
on preserving the cycle between transforming the external world and receiving nour-
ishment from it. Its title would be, then, a playful allusion “to the precarious liveli-
hood of artists” (Storr BCCB: D_F; Hixson BCCB: DDC), their proverbial difficulty to
make ends meet, or, more generally, a comment on the mundane difficulties of human
existence, its pervasive fragility, or even the dangers involved in feeding ourselves
with what is immediately at hand. However, since the extremely accurate cast of the
arm, together with its placement, “[evoke] precisely the totality of the body that the
casting process has subtracted” (Basualdo BCCH: e_), the stronger suggestion of the
work is that a life from hand to mouth is an amputated life.
A way to understand the absence of this palpably evoked body is to take it as a ref-
erence to the relation between the artist and the work. If we assume that Nauman’s
use of his wife’s body was only a matter of convenience and the cast was meant as an
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impression of himself,17 then the work, which in this case is the literal externalisation
of the artist’s body, a fragment of the self’s outermost manifestation, can be generally
considered as the externalisation of the artist’s self. An artist can thus present herself
through her art (to herself and others) only to the extent that she can turn herself into
a work, create an external image of herself that can achieve, however tentatively or
misleadingly, an identity of her own as something separate from herself. However,
under these conditions, the creator, the “I” behind the work or, in Plotinus’ terms, the
soul of the artist, has to remain invisible, while the work acts as its trace. This trace is
a symbol in the original sense: a token indicating the existence of the whole of which
it is but one half. However, in From Hand to Mouth, this unification of the external
and the internal, the two halves, is not realized: what is presented is precisely the gap
between the “I” (that cannot be presented) and its work (that is the presentation).
Even if the work is seen as an attempt “to transform intimate subjectivity into objec-
tive demonstration” with the maximum conceptual and material austerity, to catch the
artist at the moment “he acts and is acted upon” by himself (Tucker BCCB: Be), the fact
remains that the “I” that acts is visible in From Hand to Mouth only through its
absence.
This absence contributes clearly to the almost classical poignancy that characterises
From Hand to Mouth. The way the cast hangs on the wall, its fragmented status, the
posture of the face slightly bent downwards, the repose of the hand freely hanging
DF. In a DHFC interview to W. Sharp, the interviewer assumes that From Hand to Mouth is a wax im-
pression of Nauman’s own body; Nauman does not correct this assumption and discusses the work
in the context of a question about using his own body in his work (Nauman BCCe: DDE). In two in-
terviews from DHFB and DHEC (Nauman BCCe: D]e; B_F), Nauman reveals that the model was his
wife, pointing that “[i]t’s pretty difficult to make a cast of yourself” (B_F). However, most critics
who discuss the work, even after DHEC, assume that the cast was taken from Nauman’s own body,
as acknowledged by Nauman himself in his last comment on the issue: “In that case, the cast was
of someone else, not of myself as has generally been assumed—but that doesn’t really matter”
(Nauman BCCe: eBZ). And later in his career, as Plagens notes, Nauman was “drawing ‘self-por-
traits’ in the form of reverse-side—the hollow side—views of plaster casts of what may or may
not be (he’s not saying) his own face” (Plagens BCDZ: BE).
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without being engaged in any activity, make the work similar to an ancient Greek fu-
nerary relief, which is also a symbol (a sema) for an irrevocably lost body.18 This sim-
ilarity reveals a discrepancy between the temporal character of the life from hand to
mouth, an active life punctuated by preoccupation, lack, effort, satisfaction, and the
contemplative temporality fostered upon the spectator, whether sincerely or ironical-
ly, by the work. But it is also directly related to the absence of the body: in the same
sense that the work does not define a space where the external and the internal as-
pects of the self are co-presented, it also does not define a time when such co-presen-
tation is possible; thus, the work is essentially elegiac.
If indeed it is the case that for Nauman “exploring art” is “an investigation of the
self” (Morgan BCCBb: D), if, in other words, From Hand to Mouth is not only about the
artist and her body, or the artist and her work, but also about the relation between
self-knowledge and self-making, we are left with the question concerning the import
of the work. Is the work a forceful affirmation that the distance and the movement be-
tween hand and mouth closes upon itself leaving nothing behind, and is Plotinus
wrong when he insists that “even with those who practice arts of this kind, there must
be something in themselves, something which stays unmoved, according to which
they will make their works with their hands” (iii E, B, DD‒DZ)? Is it the exploration of
the hypothesis that living a life from hand to mouth is an unsatisfactory way to en-
gage in the project of being a self since it amounts to a fragmented life allowing no
possibility for self-knowledge? Is it meant in a quasi-transcendental Kantian sense, as
a claim that the “I” behind the phenomenal self can never be “shown,” i.e., can never
become an object of an intuitive presentation in experience or art? Clearly, there is no
DE. In a DHEF interview, Nauman mentions the connection between From Hand to Mouth and death
masks as pointing to a new meaning that the work had accrued for him BC years after its comple-
tion, beyond its original function as “a visual pun or a picture of a visual pun” (Nauman BCCe:
eB_).
- 18 -
definitive answer to these questions, but we can continue to pursue them by accepting
Nauman’s invitation to enter his Live-Taped Video Corridor.
Live-Taped Video Corridor (DHFC) is one of Nauman’s most successful installations.
It consists of a corridor, almost DC meters long and only _C centimetres wide, formed
by two parallel white wallboards. At the far end of the corridor, there are two video
monitors stacked on the floor. The top monitor plays live feed from a camera mount-
ed at the corridor’s entrance at a height of about three meters. The bottom monitor
features taped footage of the empty corridor from the same angle. On entering the
corridor and walking toward the monitors one views oneself on the top monitor, but,
given the location of the camera, one sees oneself from behind, diminishing in size
(receding) as one approaches the monitor. Moreover, the wide-angle lens of the cam-
era changes the rate of one’s movement: as one moves toward the monitor, one’s im-
age (of their back) appears to move faster. During this time, the bottom monitor
shows the corridor empty.19
The critical reception of the work (e.g., Krauss DHFF: BZC‒BZB; Plagens BCDZ: DeC)
has stressed the connection of Live-Taped Video Corridor to the notion of “theatrical-
ity” that Michael Fried attributed to Minimalist art in his seminal DH]F essay “Art and
Objecthood” that identified, with a polemical intention, a number of important char-
acteristics of Minimalism. At the core of this theatricality lies the concern “with the
actual circumstances in which the beholder encounters” the work of art (Fried DHHE:
D_C), a concern that aims, through the deployment of various elements in the work
and its environment, to create a “stage” in which the experience of the work would be
“of an object in a situation (…) that (…) includes the beholder” (Fried DHHE: D_C). In
DH. Nauman discusses the work in various interviews in Nauman BCCe: DDB‒DD_; B]B‒B]Z; eDB. The
DHFC Live-Taped Video Corridor belongs to a sequence of similar corridor installations that started
with Performance Corridor (DH]H), continued with corridors involving mirrors or coloured lights,
and culminated in a multi-corridor installation created in DHFC at the Nicholas Wilder Gallery in
Los Angeles, of which Live-Taped Video Corridor was essentially a part.
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other words, the aim of the Minimalist artist is to create not a work containing its
meaning or value in itself, but rather to create (the stage for) an experience of the in-
teraction between the work and the spectator, whose participation becomes thus an
integral part of the work, while the control of this participatory experience remains
with the artist.
In Live-Taped Video Corridor this notion of theatricality is fully intensified. The
staged interaction between the object and the viewer is transformed on both sides: the
viewer becomes an active performer whose physical participation is indispensable for
the actualisation of the work, while the object becomes an environmental sculpture
entirely dedicated to the manipulation of the participant’s experience. At the same
time, the artist becomes a director, exercising strict control over the movement and
the experience of the participant through the use of physical limitations or technologi-
cal devises. Thus, “in the process the viewer becomes almost an object—a sculptural
element—while external space itself seems to assume agency: overwhelming the
spectator (…) as a controlling or disciplining factor” (Kraynak BCCe: BZ). From
another point of view, following Nauman’s remarks (Nauman BCCe: DDB‒DD_), this
kind of control seems necessary if the spectator is to successfully replace the artist in
the role of the performer of the work: the initial corridor installation was “a construc-
tion originally conceived as a frame for a series of actions performed only for the
video camera” by Nauman himself (Buskirk BCC_: BZ], referring to the video work
Walk with Contrapposto, DH]E). Either way, there seems to be a convergence of the
spectator, the work, and the artist: the meaning of the work is in the end the embodied
experience of the performer during the performance.
In the context of our discussion, the spectator-performer-artist who confronts the
corridor wondering whether to enter could be understood as a Plotinian “man of ac-
tion”: an agent with the capacity to create (complex devices like the Live-Taped Video
Corridor in pursuit of his ends); a capacity to act (walk towards a destination); a con-
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sciousness of himself sufficient for this capacity (an awareness of one’s position, mo-
tion, orientation; a notion of himself as “axiomatically coordinated’ (Krauss DHFF:
BZC); and a desire to contemplate (to see what is there to be seen at the end of the cor-
ridor). This, as the work shows, is essentially a desire for self-knowledge, a desire to
see an image of one’s face that cannot be satisfied directly, without the mediation of
some external device. This agent resembles the child Dionysus, ready to project his
self-image on the mirror made by Hephaestus, the god-artist responsible for the cre-
ation of sensible things in the Neoplatonic lore (Proclus, In Tim. i DZB.BZ Diehl), and
(mis)recognise himself with pleasure in the image, in a story that, properly under-
stood, reveals, for Plotinus, the truth about the embodiment of an individual soul, i.e.,
the constitution of the human self through the establishment of an affective bond be-
tween the soul and its image based on (mis)recognition (iv e, DB, D‒DB).
Indeed, if a mirror or a camera were at the end of Nauman’s corridor, there would
be nothing unsettling in the participant’s experience. In walking toward it, her self-
experience would be in complete harmony with her perception of the process through
the reflective surface, while eventually, after the physical and psychological discom-
fort of going through the narrow corridor, she would be gratified with a self-image
that could satisfy (however misleadingly) her desire to see herself, gain self-identity
by being simultaneously the subject and object of her vision. This agent however,
would run the risk of sharing Narcissus’ fate (v E, B, eD‒e]), drowning herself in the
attempt to identify with her image. Nauman’s corridor eliminates this risk, but in a
way that makes the possibility of recognizing oneself even more precarious.
Even if we disregard the bottom monitor that shows an empty corridor, the evi-
dence of the top monitor is still unsettling, since it indicates that an instance of self-
identity between subject and object of knowledge is impossible in these conditions. In
“spatial” terms, the subject cannot see herself “face to face” but is limited to a view
of herself “from the outside,” an “outside” that can range from Plotinus’ material real-
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ity to Foucault’s modern technological surveillance mechanisms. In “temporal”
terms, the fact that the subject can see herself only from behind, that she cannot look
simultaneously at the camera and the monitor, suggests that the self cannot be seen in
the act of seeing: the attempt at self-knowledge thus implies an inevitable temporal
lag between the subject and the object of knowledge. And, of course, what is even
more unsettling is that walking toward the monitor, the only action available to the
participant, makes things even worse: she sees herself receding in the image, an expe-
rience that undermines the bond of recognition on which the self depends by bringing
into consciousness the doubling and displacement of the soul that, for Plotinus, is im-
plicated in its embodiment and the establishment of the self.
Live-Taped Video Corridor questions thus the very coherence of the self. It raises
the question “whether this complex mechanism of the self (…) simply exists as an
ongoing work-in-process, an aggregate of systemic interventions that have no clear
resolution” (Morgan BCCBb: D) and reveals the internal antinomic tensions of this
process. In comparison with From Hand to Mouth, the introduction of performative
participation through the use of video enables Nauman to move from a presentation
of the self in its external aspect, a static fragment of a totality that cannot be present-
ed, to a work in which the self is indeed presented as the stage of a dynamic yet
somehow incoherent process. This is progress in terms of art’s power to investigate
the project of being a self, but renders the project itself even more problematic. Bear-
ing this in mind, we proceed to the third and final work.
Lighted Performance Box is a sculpture installation consisting of a vertical rectan-
gular aluminium box measuring DHE.D×__.H×_C.E cm and a DCCC-watt halogen theatri-
cal lamp contained within it. Although the lamp itself is not visible, its strong light
casts a bright reflection on the ceiling above, revealing that the box is hollow and
open at the top.
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A starting point for interpreting the work is to explore its connection with Minimal-
ism. Initially this connection becomes evident in the stark sculptural shape of the rec-
tangular column that appears as a prototypical Minimalist object, a clear example of
“the use of strong gestalt or of unitary type forms to avoid divisiveness” (Robert
Morris quoted in Fried DHHE: D_C). It is also clear with respect to another important ef-
fect of the “special complicity that [the Minimalist] work extorts from the beholder”
(Fried DHHE: D__) in their staged encounter, namely, the transformation of the object
into something “like a surrogate person—that is, a kind of statue” (Fried DHHE: D__).
This impression is typically associated with “the apparent hollowness (…) the quality
of having an inside” of many Minimalist works, which leads to a strong anthro-
pomorphism “as though the work in question has an inner, even secret, life” (Fried
DHHE: D_]). As noted (Cross BCCe: De; Lewallen BCCF: EH), this kind of anthro-
pomorphism emerges in Lighted Performance Box as the cumulative effect of its hol-
lowness, scale, and placement. In this connection, the reconsideration of Pheidias’
artistic mandate to deliver “what Zeus would look like if he wanted to make him- self
visible” (v E, D, eB‒ZD) proves quite suggestive. If Zeus were to be embodied as a
physical object, he would have, in abstract terms, to acquire a material “exterior,”
which, being material and thus opaque, would run counter to his transparency as an
intelligible object. At the same time, the artist should shape this exterior in a way that
its intelligible origin could be traced while motivating its contemplative recovery. In
sum, Zeus’ statue, like Lighted Performance Box, would be an opaque material form
capable of guiding our (inner) eyes upwards or inwards towards the (noetic) light that
illuminates it. Moreover, given Plotinus’ own “anthropomorphic,” or rather “anim-
istic” assumptions about art, that is, his claim that any work of art, regardless of its
specific content, is, as a work of the soul, a “lifelikeness” (vi F, BB, eC‒eB) of its cre-
ator in which the soul “sees something akin to it or a trace of its kindred reality” (i ],
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B, H‒DC), this “generic” work of art can be equally well considered as a statue of the
artist, the spectator, or the human being.
Nauman’s regress to the most obvious “Platonic” configuration of the human being
in Lighted Performance Box (the material container of the body outside; the immater-
ial light of the soul inside) enables him to overcome the fragmentation evident in
From Hand to Mouth. Moreover, the way he develops this configuration destabilizes
the rigid distinctions that structure it (inside/outside, light/darkness) in the direction
of a greater unification. The light, with its source hidden inside the container but
pouring through the open top, renders visible the exterior of the container, that is, the
very thing that makes it invisible, revealing in this way also its own presence. Thus
the light, contained, as it were, initially within the box, in the end contains the box; in
the transition between these two moments, the container is no longer an opaque solid
object but has become a rather transparent boundary. Viewed this way, the problem of
the representation of the self is radically transformed from a move from the external
to the internal, the visible to the invisible, to an act of turning the container inside out:
all along, the external is visible because of its invisible internal and vice versa, an
idea particularly pronounced also in Plotinus (iv e, H, e]‒Ze; v _, H, BH‒eD).
However, Lighted Performance Box, as a minimalist work, in full compliance with
Fried’s conception of minimalism, is also “theatrical.” Its theatricality is clearly sug-
gested by the word “performance” in its title: in a typical display of Nauman’s strict
“conceptual restraint” in its “economy of mediums” (Battle BCCH: E_), the work, al-
though still a sculptural object, is not merely set on stage, but is itself the stage for a
performance. Understanding the nature of this performance becomes thus a necessary
component for the full appreciation of the work.
The performance may refer to the reaction that the work “extorts” from the viewer.
After the first impression, that of an opaque solid box, the shape of the box, “whose
‘gestalt’ is supposedly delivered at a glance as an imperative to look upward” (Leider
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DHFC: FC), directs our gaze to the illuminated space above the box. As the reflection of
light captures our attention, we realise that the box is nothing but a hollow container
for the light. The overall result is that we view the work by moving our head or eyes
“up and down, like a yo-yo” (Leider DHFC: FC) between the physical object and the il-
luminated reflection, perhaps in a repeatedly frustrated attempt to trace the projected
light back to its invisible source. That we become aware of the contents of the box by
looking at the light’s projection on the ceiling and not by looking directly inside the
box “suggests that the real focus lies outside the artwork itself” (Cross BCCe: De), at a
place, however, which the work reveals with its presence. Complicating things a lit-
tle, the clear phenomenal focus provided by the reflected light, as strongly as it di-
rects our attention outside the work, equally strongly suggests the existence of the
source of light as the real focus within the invisible interior of the work.
The reaction described in the previous paragraph, suggests clearly that Lighted Per-
formance Box is not a work that can be “taken in” in a single instance, a work “whol-
ly manifest (…) at every moment” (Fried DHHE: D]F). Rather, our experience of it can
be described in temporal terms as “a presentment of endless and indefinite duration”
(ibid. D]]), “a sense of time both passing and to come, simultaneously approaching
and receding, as if apprehended in an infinite perspective” (ibid. D]F). From this point
of view, Nauman’s ability to overcome the fragmentation of From Hand to Mouth
rests on the deployment of the temporality that for Plotinus characterises the exis-
tence of embodied souls, since their embodiment implies that they “have somewhere
they come from (…) and somewhere to go to, and a going down and going about:
consequently also a going up” (iii H, e, _‒]), and hence time is for them an indefinite
duration of moving in two opposite directions.
However, there are more possibilities worth pursuing concerning the “performance”
implied by the title of the work. Taking a lead from an earlier similar sculpture, Light-
ed Center Piece (DH]F), which consists of an aluminium square illuminated from four
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sides by halogen lamps so that “[a]ll attention is focused on the blank surface as if on
an empty stage,” and “the human presence is suggested by its absence,” the point of
the work seems to be that “the spectator is left to conjure up the actor” (Lewallen
BCCF: EH), or, in other words, that “the work provokes the viewer to mentally project
the image of the artist or even of his or her own body into the space” (Cross BCCe: De).
In response to this “provocation” (which could be compared to Plotinus’ claim that
the work of art, by being attractive to soul, is capable of issuing an invitation to it and
receive a share of it; iv e, DD, D‒E), the viewer establishes an anthropomorphic link,
seeing the box as a statue, of the artist or herself, or attempts to occupy the per-
forming stage through projection, “to climb into the box and stand under the bright
light” (van Bruggen DHEE: BeE). In both cases, “the performer-spectator is made aware
of the physical limitations the artist has imposed” (ibid.) through the opacity of the
box. Viewed as a statue, the box offers no expressive inducements to anthro-
pomorphic identification, no specific intimation of its “inner, even secret, life” (Fried
DHHE: D__); viewed as a theatre, the box does not have any physical point of entrance
or any window that could allow the spectator at least some glimpse of the stage. The
existence of these physical limitations suggests that the performance of Lighted Per-
formance Box is not a physical action, but rather a mental exercise, similar to the ones
we find scattered throughout Plotinus’ works (e.g., vi Z, F, DH‒ZC, which contains an
example that seems quite relevant to the experience of the spectator “climbing into”
Nauman’s box).
Crossing the distance from hand to mouth, entering the corridor, or turning the box
inside out, involves different kinds of physical or mental activity and implies differ-
ent relations between the artist, the work, and the spectator. However, they all seem to
suggest very similar metaphoric exercises. What do these exercises, prompted and
guided by visual or verbal metaphors, tell us about the project of being a self, of ac-
quiring a self-identity? Carl Hausman suggests that a world “which includes the out-
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comes of metaphors must be understood as a totality of identities” (Hausman DHEH:
DHD). For Hausman, these identities refer not only to “whatever is” but also to what
“could be.”20 In the context of selfhood, this suggests that gaining a self-identity is
not a task that can be accomplished by uncovering an internal “I,” or by recording
thoughts, experiences and actions, or by constructing fully coherent and unified nar-
ratives. The self, as Plotinus suggests, is a multiplicity of metaphoric links that the
soul, qua creator and spectator of its own image, establishes with itself through the
mediation of its creations. These links are invariably fragmented, displaced, or
opaque. However, like any “live” metaphor, the self, if it is to remain alive, cannot be
defined or resolved through literalization; hence, it remains open-ended, always a
work-in-progress. And it is in respect of the intricacies and implications of this idea
that Plotinus offers a way to interpret Nauman’s works and Nauman’s art illuminates
aspects articulated theoretically by Plotinus.21
BC. For a related discussion of Hausman’s position see, Vassilopoulou & Ganeri BCC_: H.
BD. An earlier version of this chapter was delivered as a lecture during my B-year Philosophy Residen-
cy at the Bluecoat Arts Centre (BCDe‒D_). It formed the source of inspiration for Mythos, a perfor-
mance piece by vocal artist Steve Boyland. The piece premiered in Liverpool in BCDZ and has
since been performed in many venues around Europe. In turn, Steve’s creative output and discus-
sions I had with other members of the public have greatly informed the development of this chap-
ter. I would like to thank the Bluecoat and its public for their generous support of my research.
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